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U ntil recently, border controlhad changed little over theyears, despite advancing tech-nology. Now, travelers rou-tinely print out e-tickets from
their computers, and many countries
have started issuing e-passports with
embedded biometric information.
However, countries are taking different
approaches to e-passports, raising con-
cerns about how travelers can replace
them in the event they’re lost or stolen.
Travelers report the loss or theft of
hundreds of thousands of passports
each year. The Australian government
estimates that 30,000 of the 1 million
passports it issues annually are lost or
stolen (http://foreignminister.gov.au/
releases/2005/fa083_05.html), and in
2006, the United Kingdom reported
that more than 290,000 passports
were lost or stolen (http://press.home-
office.gov.uk/press-releases/passport-
warning?version=1).
E-PASSPORT INITIATIVES
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the US government launched a
machine-readable passport (MRP)
program to provide more secure bor-
der control. The next-generation pass-
port that the US State Department
began issuing in August 2006 features
a contactless integrated circuit (IC) in
the rear cover containing biographic
data (name, date of birth, gender, place
of birth, dates of passport issuance and
expiration, and passport number) and
a digital image of the bearer that
authorities can use for facial-recogni-
tion comparisons.
Metallic material in the e-passport’s
front cover and spine is intended to
prevent the chip from being skimmed
or read when the passport is closed.
Other security features include basic
access-control technology, which
requires electronic reading of the data
page to unlock the chip; a randomized
unique identification feature to reduce
the chances of tracking; and an elec-
tronic signature to prevent data alter-
ation and let authorities validate and
authenticate the data.
The US is also pushing the 27 coun-
tries in its visa-waiver program to
endorse e-passports. Such programs
are now under way in most of those
countries, but they’re using a variety
of approaches to the types of biomet-
ric information the passports contain,
with some using only facial charac-
teristics and others including finger-
prints and iris scans.
Most e-passport projects or initia-
tives meet the International Civiliza-
tion Aviation Organization’s 2003
standards, which require the encod-
ing of biometric information on a
chip. Most countries also use radio
frequency identification technology in
their e-passports. However, chip-
based e-passports have the same prob-
lem as conventional passports in
authenticating the passport owner in
the event the passport is stolen or lost.
TRADITIONAL PASSPORT
PROCESS
A citizen applying for a traditional
passport typically must provide doc-
umentation of his identity and submit
an application to the passport author-
ity, which verifies the submitted mate-
rials’ accuracy from the passport
repository. The authority then issues
the passport and adds the information
to the repository for archiving or
monitoring.
Depending on the country, it can
take from weeks to months to process
a passport application. Even in urgent
situations, securing a replacement
passport can take several days. If a
traveler’s passport is lost or stolen, the
traveler must appear in person at the
passport authority to apply for a
replacement, even though passport
authorities aren’t always nearby. For
example, an overseas traveler could be
visiting a country that doesn’t have a
passport authority. Without a pass-
port, the traveler could find it difficult
to enter the country where the pass-
port authority is located. In the mean-
time, wrongdoers could use a passport
for illicit purposes before it’s reported
lost or stolen.
E-PASSPORT MECHANISM
In addition to conventional identi-
fiers, e-passports typically contain 
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collect it on the spot. In fact, having
the passport repository keep travelers’
biometric information could effec-
tively prevent IC card fraud.
Authorities could assign two num-
bers to IC cards: a difficult-to-remem-
ber 16-digit number displayed on the
card and an easy-to-remember five-
digit reference number. When travel-
ers lose their IC cards, they could
produce the reference number as one
of their credentials.
Figure 2 illustrates how systems
could verify travelers with IC cards
using the following steps:
1. A traveler presents an IC card to
swipe at the control point.
2. The control-point computer uses
information on the IC card to
connect to the correct passport 
repository.
biometric information such as finger-
prints, iris scans, or DNA samples.
Passport authorities can collect the
biometric information when citizens
submit applications or appear for
passport interviews. Because such data
offers a unique means of personal
identification, agencies could retrieve
and match travelers’ identities when
they appear at border and customs
checkpoints or airline check-in coun-
ters. Figure 1 illustrates the usual infor-
mation structure of an e-passport.
Local passport repositories could
store the information and allow only
authorized parties to access it. Many
passport authorities issue IC cards
containing traditional text-based
information, like age, nationality,
height, gender, and so on. The IC
cards don’t need to contain biometric
information because authorities could
3. The passport repository authenti-
cates the request and replies with
the traveler’s biometric informa-
tion.
4. Control-point officials let the trav-
eler approach the bioreading
device.
5. The system collects the traveler’s
biometric information and com-
pares it with the biometric in-
formation from the passport 
repository.
6. The system reports the successful
or failed verification to the pass-
port repository for tracking.
7. If two sets of biometric informa-
tion match, the traveler can pro-
ceed through the control point.
Figure 3 shows the verification
process that authorities could use 
for travelers without IC cards. The
process includes the following steps:
1. The traveler must enter text-based
information, such as a passport,
social security, or driver’s license
number.
2. The control point contacts the 
passport repository to retrieve the 
e-passport’s text-based informa-
tion.
3. The passport repository provides
the requested information.
4. Control-point officials ask the
traveler questions related to the
text-based information.
5. If the traveler’s answers match the
retrieved information, the traveler’s
identity is initially recognized.
6. If the verification is successful, the
control point contacts the passport
repository again to get the trav-
eler’s biometric information.
7. The control point lets the traveler
approach the bioreader.
8. The control point collects the bio-
metric information and matches it
with information received from
the repository.
9. The system reports the successful
or failed verification to the pass-
port repository for tracking.
10. If the verification is successful, the
traveler is allowed to pass through
the control point.
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Figure 1. E-passport data structure. E-passports contain both traditional text information
and personal biometric information.
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Figure 2. Verification with IC cards.The IC card is swiped at a control point, and the 
passport authority authenticates the request.
October 2007 91
without performance penalties.
For example, suppose that a new
international airport has opened.
Previous facilities must recognize
the airport’s new control points,
and all control points in the new
airport must have access to all
passport repositories.
In addition to robust network sup-
port, successful verification processes
depend on effective support from the
passport repository and a reliable
access-control system. E-passport sys-
tems also require strong government
support. If biometric and text infor-
mation is recorded together in one IC
card, the system can’t verify travelers’
identities when the passports are lost
or stolen.
W e propose an e-passport mech-anism that separates travelers’biometric information from
their IC cards. If such a mechanism
It’s clear from these verification-
process scenarios that the Internet
plays an important role for all trans-
actions. Thus, e-passport systems will
require robust network support.
NETWORK SUPPORT
The robust network needed to sup-
port an e-passport system must con-
nect all border-control and customs
checkpoints, airline check-in counters,
passport authorities, and some gov-
ernment embassies and consulates.
Such a network must meet a variety of
requirements, including the following:
• Security and privacy. Because 
e-passport systems must transmit
sensitive personal information, net-
works must have strong security
and privacy techniques to ensure
that malicious parties can’t alter or
eavesdrop on that information. We
can easily anticipate that e-pass-
port networks will become targets
of a variety of attacks.
• Accuracy. E-passport systems must
record information accurately when
they collect, store, transfer, and ver-
ify travelers’ digital identities.
• Promptness. The system should
have a short response time for
acquiring travelers’ information.
We estimate a one-minute maxi-
mum as an acceptable processing
time for the control point to
retrieve a traveler’s information.
Neither travelers nor control offi-
cers would accept a retrieval time
of more than five minutes. 
• Availability. The network infra-
structure must work effectively
around the clock and throughout
the year. Control points must be
able to reach passport repositories
whenever the system needs the
information. E-passport systems
won’t be viable if the system’s
availability isn’t ensured.
• Scalability. Future expansion or
reduction of e-passport nodes
must not affect the performance of
the e-passport network infrastruc-
ture. Scalability ensures that the
current e-passport system reflects
all changes in a timely manner and
were implemented, travelers could
stop worrying about lost or stolen
passports. One of the most important
concerns, the privacy of e-passports, is
a subject for another article. ■
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Figure 3. Verification without IC cards.The traveler enters credential information at the
control point, which retrieves information from the passport repository.
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